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Intention-Based Reciprocity and Signaling of Intentions∗
Séverine Toussaert†
March 2, 2017
Intentions count in your actions. Abu Bakr
Abstract
Many experiments find that trust intentions are a key determinant of prosociality. If in-
tentions matter, then prosociality should depend on whether trust intentions can be credibly
conveyed. This conjecture is formalized and tested in a noisy trust game where I vary the extent
to which trust can be credibly signaled. I find that the introduction of noise threatens the onset
of trust relations and induces players to form more pessimistic beliefs. Therefore policies that
increase transparency of the decision-making environment may foster prosociality. However, the
potential impact of such policies could be limited by a large heterogeneity in how individuals
respond to changes in their information environment.
JEL classification: C91, D63, D64
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1. Introduction
Trust is often perceived as an essential element of social capital (Putnam 1995) as well as a “lubri-
cant” for economic transactions (Arrow 1974). A central feature of trust relations is their reliance
on an informal agreement rather than on an explicit contract whose terms are costly to enforce.
Due to their implicit nature, relationships of trust are subject to all sorts of uncertainty, which may
threaten the very establishment of trust. Understanding the conditions under which trust can arise
seems therefore of particular importance.
Trust relations have been widely studied in the context of two-person experimental trust games
between a Sender and a Receiver. In this class of games, relationships of trust are characterized by
the following three conditions: (i) both parties can mutually benefit from the relationship, (ii) the
Sender takes a risk by trusting the Receiver, (iii) the Receiver incurs a monetary cost by reciprocating
the Sender’s trust (McCabe et al. 2003). It is a robust finding that a large proportion of players
deviate from the subgame perfect equilibrium of no trust predicted by standard non-cooperative
theory (Berg et al. 1995, McCabe et al. 1998, Camerer 2003).
One mechanism proposed to explain these findings is that Receivers like to reciprocate the risk
taken by the Sender for it signals his intention to trust. Many studies provide credence to this
interpretation by reporting evidence of intention-based reciprocity in a variety of settings, including
trust games and other well-known social dilemma games.1 These studies typically compare an
Intention Treatment, where the first mover’s action was chosen intentionally, to a No-Intention
treatment, where the first mover’s action was either implemented by a random device or was the
only option available.2 For instance, McCabe et al. (2003) find that the percentage of Receivers who
share is twice as high when the Sender’s decision to trust was voluntary rather than involuntary.
Although there is evidence that intentions matter, almost all existing studies restrict attention
to environments of full information, where actions perfectly reflect intentions. By doing so, they
abstract away from the uncertainty inherent in trust relationships, where decisions often account for
many implicit considerations and constraints, which render intentions hard to read. In this respect,
one could worry that reciprocity considerations might disappear as soon as actions become noisy
signals of trust, which in turn might deter trust.
To illustrate this point, consider the hiring decisions of a private company or university research
1See Blount (1995) in an ultimatum game, McCabe et al. (2003) and Cox et al. (2006) in trust games, Charness
(2004) and Charness and Levine (2007) in gift exchange games, Rand et al. (2015) in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma,
or Offerman (2002), Falk et al. (2008) and Cox et al. (2008) in sequential games allowing for both positive and
negative reciprocal behavior.
2Alternatively, some papers test for intention-based reciprocity by comparing treatments which differ in the alter-
native(s) forgone by first movers, as varying their outside options may lead second movers to make different inferences
about their partner’s intentions (see Brandts and Solà 2000, Falk et al. 2003 or Charness and Rabin 2002, 2005).
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department. After several rounds of interviews, the preferred candidate receives a job offer; if
he/she turns down the offer, the second best candidate on the list is offered the job and the process
continues until a candidate accepts. Under those circumstances, one might expect the motivation
of the new recruit to be higher if the job offer clearly signals an act of trust in his/her ability to
perform successfully. The strength of this signal will generally depend on the level of uncertainty
around the selection process, including the number of candidates who previously turned down the
offer. If successful candidates feel less invested when the selection procedure is opaque, then hiring
committees may in turn lack trust in their own recruits.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the extent to which the onset of trust relations might
depend on the credibility with which intentions to trust can be conveyed. To study this question,
I consider a noisy binary trust game where I vary the likelihood with which the Sender’s action is
implemented: with some common knowledge probability p, the Receiver faces the Sender’s decision,
while with probability (1 − p), the Sender’s decision is replaced by the random choice of a com-
puter. In the experiment, subjects make decisions under the strategy method for all values of p in
{0, 0.1, ..., 1}, which allows to analyze the sensitivity of individual strategies to the amount of noise.
For each value of p, I also elicit the Receiver’s belief about the Sender’s choice and the Sender’s
belief about the guess of his partner.3
If intentions matter, then prosocial behavior and beliefs should be affected by how much control
the Sender possesses over the outcome. Intuitively, when p is low, the Sender’s decision is unlikely
to matter; in this case, no credible signal of trust can be sent and the Receiver should feel little
inclined to act prosocially. On the other hand, when p is high, the Receiver is more likely to be
facing the Sender’s choice, which should increase his propensity to reciprocate. In turn, whether
the Sender decides to trust should be affected by the possibility to credibly signal trust, which is
more likely if p is high. I formalize this intuition in a simple model in which I isolate the behavioral
implications of intention-based reciprocity relative to other concerns.
The present paper speaks to a burgeoning literature connecting prosociality to intentions in
environments of imperfect information. Most connected to this study, two papers consider noisy
binary games where the intended action is implemented with some probability p, and reversed
otherwise.4 In a binary trust game, Cox et al. (2006) find that the Receiver’s degree of prosociality
does not significantly decrease when the Sender’s action is only implemented with probability p = 34
3Besides this baseline treatment, the original design comprised two other treatments, which are not presented in
this paper. In those treatments, the decision environment was more complex and artificial, making results harder to
interpret. See Section 3 and the Online Appendix for more details about those two treatments.
4A few other papers link prosocial behavior to intentionality in games of incomplete information, i.e. games where
there is a lack of common knowledge about other players’ preferences or payoffs (Attanasi et al. 2015, McCabe et
al. 1998). For instance, McCabe et al. (1998) find that when players only know their own payoffs, behavior closely
follows Nash equilibrium predictions for rational and selfish agents.
3
Page 4 of 25
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
and remains higher compared to when a coin flip decides for the Sender (i.e. p = 0); however,
Senders do not anticipate this and trust significantly less. In a noisy repeated prisoner’s dilemma
with p = 78 , Rand et al. (2015) compare cooperation rates when intended actions are observable
versus unobservable; they find that the cooperation rate is higher when intentions are observable
and matches the rate observed when p = 1.
The present study complements the above papers in several ways. First, while both papers
restrict attention to small departures from the perfect information case, this paper analyzes how
prosocial behavior responds to changes in the amount of noise (1 − p) over the entire spectrum.
Second, this paper augments the binary choice data with players’ beliefs in order to gather ad-
ditional insights into how subjects interpret the noise. Finally, unlike previous studies, this paper
exploits within-subject variation to identify the effect of noise on prosociality, thus allowing to assess
whether individual heterogeneity exists in how subjects respond to changes in their decision-making
environment.
In this experimental setting, I find that prosocial behavior and beliefs are affected by how much
control the Sender has over the outcome. At the aggregate level, the trust-reciprocity outcome is
less likely to emerge as the value of p decreases; furthermore, beliefs become progressively more
pessimistic. Thus, whether trust intentions can be credibly communicated through actions matters
for prosociality. While intentions matter, they do not seem to matter for everyone. The individual-
level analysis indeed reveals substantial heterogeneity in how subjects respond to the noise, with
a large fraction of players being irresponsive to p. Furthermore, if intentions seem to be a key
determinant of prosociality, social image concerns appear to be almost as equally important to
explain aggregate behavior.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the noisy trust game
on which the experiment is based and discusses the role of intentions in a simple model. Section
3 describes the experimental design, while Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 con-
cludes. Instructions and supplemental material can be found in an Online Appendix (henceforth
OA) available on the author’s website.
2. Intentions in a noisy trust game
In this section, I introduce the noisy trust game on which the experiment is based (Section 2.1) and
discuss in a simple model the role of intentions relative to other prosocial concerns (Section 2.2).
4
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2.1 The noisy binary trust game
Consider the noisy trust game represented in Figure 1 by the tree Γ(p), where p parametrizes the
amount of noise in the game. Payoffs are in dollars.
1− pp
Nature
InOut
(5, 5)
Player A
Out (0.5)
(5, 5)
In (0.5)
Computer
Meet
(10, 10)
Take
(2, 14)
Player B
Meet
(10, 10)
Take
(2, 14)
1
Figure 1: The game form Γ(p)
To understand this game, it is useful to consider the two special cases where p = 0 and p = 1,
which have been widely studied in the literature. When p = 1 and this is common knowledge, the
game simplifies to a standard mini trust game: A (the Sender) can choose to invest in a relationship
with B (the Receiver) or to stay Out of the relationship; if A chooses In, B can choose to meet
A’s investment by sharing gains, or take most of the benefits for himself. At the other extreme,
when p = 0, the game reduces to a mini dictator game: in this case, a computer randomly makes
a choice for A by playing a mixed strategy 50/50 between In and Out. If B only cared about his
own material payoffs, observed behavior would be identical in those two games: B would choose
Take and by backward induction, A would go Out in the trust game. However, one typical finding
is that a substantial fraction of A and B players exhibit prosocial behavior in those games. For
instance, in the trust game with the most similar environment and payoff structure, Charness and
Dufwenberg (2006) find that 44% of B players share and 56% of A players go In. Furthermore, it is
a fairly robust result that B’s propensity to share tends to be higher in the trust game than in the
corresponding dictator game. For instance, Cox et al. (2006) find that 63.6% of Receivers cooperate
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when p = 1, while this number drops to 35% when p = 0.5 These observed behavioral differences
are usually interpreted as reflecting B’s reciprocity concerns in the trust game: by risking to go In,
A signals his intention to enter in a relationship of trust with B, an act that B rewards by choosing
Meet.
What would happen if some noise were introduced regarding the nature of the game? Consider
the case where p ∈ (0, 1) is common knowledge but players do not observe Nature’s move. Further-
more, assume that B receives no information about the choice of A or the computer’s draw. In this
case, upon observing the realization of In, B cannot directly attribute this outcome to a trusting
move of A. Under such circumstances, one would expect B’s propensity to share to increase with p
for two reasons. First, when p is low, B is less likely to be facing A’s choice.6 Second, even if B were
facing A’s action for certain, B would discount A’s choice since choosing In presented a low risk for
A in the first place: whatever A chooses, his fate will most likely be determined by the computer.
In other words, when p is low, A’s choice to go In is a weaker signal of trust than when p is high.
Consequently, one would expect A’s propensity to go In to depend on the credibility of the signal
associated with this choice: if A believes in B’s trustworthiness, A should be more confident about
choosing In as p increases. This intuition is discussed more formally in the next section.
2.2 Intentions and prosociality in the noisy trust game
2.2.1 Strategies and beliefs
Let σA ∈ 4(SA) be player A’s propensity to choose In in Γ(p) where SA := {In, Out}. Similarly, let
σB ∈ 4(SB) be player B’s propensity to choose Meet in Γ(p) where SB := {Meet, Take}. Finally,
let σC =
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
denote the computer’s mixed strategy and assume that σC is common knowledge.
In the following analysis, I assume that individuals only play pure strategies (σi ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ {A,B})
and choose the prosocial action (In for A and Meet for B) whenever indifferent. A mixed strategy
σi ∈ (0, 1) is then interpreted as coming from a statistical distribution of pure strategies played by
individuals in role i who were drawn at random.7
In imperfect information environments such as Γ(p), beliefs play an important role. Let σ∗A :=
EB [σA | Γ(p)] denote player B’s prior belief about σA, referred to as B’s first-order belief ; in words,
σ∗A captures B’s confidence at the start of the game that A will choose In. In turn, let σ
∗∗
A :=
5See also Camerer (2003), Cox (2004) and McCabe et al. (2003).
6Notice that given their noise structure, this intuition cannot be as straightforwardly captured by Cox et al. (2006)
and Rand et al. (2013). Indeed, in their environment, A’s action is either implemented or reversed, so A can still
retain control over the outcome as p tends to 0 by simply flipping her choice.
7Thus, σi(si) ∈ (0, 1) refers to the fraction of individuals in role i playing si, as well as to the objective probability
with which si is played. In this respect, I follow Nash’s mass action interpretation (Weibull 1996), which was also
adopted in recent work (see for instance Attanasi et al. 2016).
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EA [σ∗A | Γ(p)] be A’s prior belief about σ∗A, or A’s second-order belief ; that is, σ∗∗A measures A’s
confidence perception.
2.2.2 Preferences
For simplicity and to minimize departures from the standard theory, I assume that player A is a
standard expected utility maximizer with selfish preferences:
uA(σ) = mA(σ)
where mi(σ) denotes i’s material payoffs (i ∈ {A,B}) under strategy profile σ.8 On the other hand,
assume that the preferences of B take the following form:
uB(σ) = mB(σ) + [α+ 1{In}θ(p, σ∗A)]mA(σ)
where α ∈ [0, 1], θ(., .) is a weakly positive and continuous function discussed below, and 1{In} is an
indicator variable for whether In was realized. Here, B’s decision betweenMeet (σB = 1) and Take
(σB = 0) may depend on two types of prosocial concerns. First, B may care about A’s material
payoffs out of pure altruism; this is captured by the altruistic parameter α ≥ 0, which does not
depend on A’s action.9 Second, upon observing In, B may care about A’s payoffs to the extent
that he believes In was A’s intention to trust, as modeled by the reciprocity function θ(p, σ∗A). As
argued in Section 2.1, perceived trust should depend not only on B’s belief that A choose In, σ∗A,
but also on the probability p with which A’s action is implemented, since choosing In cannot be
perceived as an act of trust when p is low. I therefore assume that the reciprocity function θ(p, σ∗A)
has the following properties:
A1 : θ(0, σ∗A) = θ(p, 0) = 0 for all p < 1
A2 : (
∂θ
∂σ∗A
,
∂θ
∂p
) 	 0
A3 : θ(1, σ∗A) = θ ≤ 1
In words, a reciprocal B player only cares about A’s payoffs if he believes that A chose In with
some positive probability and if A’s decision has a positive chance of being implemented (A1). In
8This assumption about the first mover is fairly common in the literature on belief-dependent motivations; see for
instance, Geanakoplos et al. (1989), Dufwenberg (2002), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Battigalli and Dufwenberg
(2009) or Tadelis (2011). The Online Appendix of a previous version of this paper (available on the website on the
author) contains an extension where A is allowed to exhibit social preferences; the main message is preserved.
9I assume that B puts a weakly lower weight on A’s payoffs than on his own payoffs (α ≤ 1) to be consistent with
the experimental literature; however, this restriction has no consequences in the discussion below.
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those cases, B’s sensitivity to A’s payoffs is increasing in his prior belief that A chose In and in
A’s level of agency in determining the outcome (A2). Finally, when A bears the full consequences
of his decision (p = 1) and In is realized, B must interpret the outcome as an act of trust from A,
regardless of his initial beliefs (A3); the restriction θ ≤ 1 ensures that B puts (weakly) less weight
on A’s payoffs than on his own payoffs. It is worth noting that the above properties are compatible
with many specifications of the reciprocity function, which captures B’s concern for A’s in entions
in a reduced-form manner as in Charness and Rabin (2002).10
2.2.3 Optimal strategies as a function of p
In the following, I derive comparative statics with respect to p, depending on the value of the
preference parameters (α, θ). As in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), I analyze the game without
making equilibrium assumptions, which are particularly restrictive in one-shot interactions with no
learning. Under the above specification of preferences, B will choose Meet over Take when In is
realized if and only if
uB(σA, 1) ≥ uB(σA, 0)
⇔ 10 + 10[α+ θ(p, σ∗A)] ≥ 14 + 2[α+ θ(p, σ∗A)]
⇔ α+ θ(p, σ∗A) ≥
1
2
(∗)
There are 3 cases depending on the value of α and θ:
Selfish case: α+ θ < 1
2
. In this case, condition (∗) is never satisfied and σB(p) = 0 for all p, that
is, B chooses Take irrespective of the amount of noise. Therefore, A’s optimal response is to choose
Out, i.e. σA(p) = 0 for all p.
Pure altruism case: α ≥ 1
2
. Here, (∗) is always satisfied, regardless of p and σ∗A. Thus σB(p) = 1
for all p, that is, B chooses Meet irrespective of the amount of noise. As a response, A always
chooses In, i.e. σA(p) = 1 for all p.
Intentions matter: α+θ ≥ 1
2
and α < 1
2
. In this case, B chooses Meet if and only if θ(p, σ∗A) ≥
1
2 − α. Notice that by assumptions A1 and A3, B chooses Take if p = 0 and Meet if p = 1.
Let σ¯(p) be such that θ(p, σ¯(p)) = 12 − α. Then B chooses Meet if and only if σ∗A ≥ σ¯(p) where
10For instance, a previous version of this paper assumed that θ(p, σ*A) = θµ(p, σ∗A) where µ(p, σ∗A) :=
pσ∗A
pσ∗
A
+ 1
2
(1−p)
is B’s posterior belief after observing In that the outcome comes from A (assume µ = 1 if p = 1 and σ∗A = 0). In
this case, ∂θ
∂σ∗
A
> 0 for all p ∈ (0, 1), and ∂θ
∂p
> 0 for all σ∗A > 0. These assumptions are also compatible with the
predictions made by existing psychological game theories of intention-based reciprocity (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger 2004, Falk and Fischbacher 2006); for instance, it can be shown that optimal strategies are monotone
increasing in p in the framework of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).
8
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∂σ¯
∂p = − ∂θ/∂p∂θ/∂σ¯ ≤ 0 (by the implicit function theorem and assumption A2). In turn, A chooses In if
and only if σ∗∗A ≥ σ¯(p). Therefore, σB(p) and σA(p) are increasing in p.
In summary, rates of prosociality should be monotone increasing in p if players believe that trust
intentions matter in the noisy trust game; on the other hand, behavior will be irresponsive to p for
selfish and purely altruistic agents.
3. Experimental design and procedures
The experiment was conducted at the Center for Experimental Social Science (CESS) of New York
University with a regular student subject pool. Sessions lasted about 45 minutes. At the start of
the session, subjects were randomly assigned a role, either A or B, and matched with one person
in the other role for the entire session. All interactions took place through computer terminals;
the experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). To
establish common knowledge of the rules of the game, paper instructions were distributed to all
subjects and read collectively. Each session was divided in two parts corresponding to the elicitation
of subjects’ strategies (Part 1) and the elicitation of their beliefs about their matched partner (Part
2). Instructions for the second part were distributed only after completion of Part 1 and subjects
received no feedback between the two parts. At the end of the session, subjects answered a short
questionnaire in order to assess their understanding of the experiment (see OA-C.4). In addition to
their incentive payments for Parts 1 & 2, subjects received a $5 show-up fee.
The key experimental variable was the probability p that A’s action would be implemented. In
Part 1, subjects in role A (B) made a series of choices between In and Out (Meet and Take) for 11
values of p from 0 to 1 in increments of 0.1, in order to elicit σA(p) and σB(p).11 The probability
values were presented in ascending order and framed as a percentage chance. The boundary cases
of p = 0 (dictator game) and p = 1 (standard trust game) were included in order to facilitate
comparisons with the existing literature. The choices of B were elicited using the strategy method
(Selten 1967); that is, B made choices without knowing whether In was realized and was asked
to behave assuming this was the case.12 Finally, subjects were told that their decisions would be
implemented for one randomly selected value of p.
In Part 2, B was asked to guess the likelihood that A chose In for each value of p, corresponding
to B’s first-order beliefs σ∗A(p). In turn, A was asked to guess B’s answer for each p, corresponding
11The instructions used more neutral names for B’s actions, replacing Take with Up and Meet with Down.
12This method is widely used in experimental economics, for it allows to elicit the complete strategy profile of a
given player. Although its effects are not fully understood, the strategy method often appears to trigger less emotional
responses than the direct response method (Brandts and Charness 2011, Casari and Cason 2009). Thus, if anything,
one would a priori expect a downward bias on the effect of perceived intentions in the noisy trust game.
9
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to A’s second-order beliefs σ∗∗A (p). Subjects were paid according to their guess for the randomly
selected value of p. B’s first-order beliefs were incentivized using a method similar in spirit to
the Becker-Degroot-Marschak (1964) mechanism, which provides a dominant strategy to reveal
correct beliefs independently of the subject’s risk attitudes.13 More precisely, B was asked to
assess the percentage chance that A chose In by choosing a number x among the set of options
{0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100}. Secondly, an integer n between 0 and 100 was drawn at
random. If x ≥ n, then B received 5 dollars if A chose In and 0 otherwise; if x < n, B received
5 dollars with a n % chance (and 0 otherwise). Subjects were given an example explaining why
it was in their best interest to report their true beliefs. To minimize the cognitive demand on the
A players who were asked for their second-order beliefs, the latter were incentivized by offering 5
dollars for correctly guessing B’s answer (out of the 11 possible options) and 0 otherwise.
Besides this baseline treatment (called No Information in a previous version), I ran two addi-
tional treatments, which are not analyzed in this paper: Exogenous Information (EI ) where the
Receiver is exogenously informed of the Sender’s choice; Costly Communication (COM ) where the
Sender can pay a cost to inform the Receiver of his choice. In both treatments, Receivers made
decisions under the strategy method for each value of p and possible choice of the Sender. In COM,
in addition to the baseline beliefs, B guessed A’s likelihood of paying the signaling cost if he chose
In (Out) and A guessed B’s answers. In those two treatments, the use of the strategy method
appears more artificial since B could not observe A’s decisions; furthermore, subjects had to take
a large number of decisions (actions and beliefs). As a consequence, the findings for EI and COM
are harder to interpret. A summary of the main findings can be found in Section B of the Online
Appendix as well as in a previous version of this paper, both available on the website of the author.
4. Results
This experiment was conducted with a total of 76 subjects (38 pairs) spread over 5 sessions; for each
role, the dataset therefore contains 418 (= 11×38) binary choices of an action and 418 belief guesses
in {0, 0.1, ..., 1} made by a given subject for a specific value of p. Except if specified otherwise, the
statistical results of this section are based on OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the
subject level (or at the level of a match when appropriate) to account for within-subject correlation
across decisions; results are shown both with and without observations for p = 0, since A’s decisions
were inconsequential in this case. Significance is assessed with one-sided t-tests when there is a
directional hypothesis and two-sided t-tests otherwise. Section 4.1 studies the aggregate response
13For a formal analysis of this procedure, see Schlag and van der Weele (2013).
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of behavior and beliefs to the value of p, while Section 4.2 studies individual heterogeneity.
4.1 Aggregate behavior and beliefs
4.1.1 Rates of prosocial behavior as a function of p
Figure 2: Aggregate behavior as a function of p
(a) Rate of prosociality by p
MRS 03
CD2 06
CD2 06
CD1 06
MRS 03
MRS 03
CD2 06
CD2 06
CD2 06
CD1 06
.3
.4
.5
.6
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
value of p
Observed In rate σ A Observed Meet rate σ B
In rate in other papers Meet rate in other papers
(b) Proportion of No Trust and Trust profiles by p
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
value of p
(Out, Take) (In, Meet)
Notes: In Panel (a), MRS 03 refers to McCabe et al. (2003), CD1 06 refers to Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and
CD2 06 refers to Cox and Deck (2006).
Figure 2 Panel (a) shows the fraction of A (resp. B) players who chose In (resp. Meet) for each
value of p; as a benchmark, I also report the rates of prosociality observed in the 3 studies most
connected to this paper, McCabe et al. (2003, MRS 03), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006, CD1 06)
and Cox and Deck (2006, CD2 06), for the values of p that were tested in each paper.14 Combining
the behavior of A and B, Panel (b) shows the proportion of realized Trust and No Trust profiles,
(In,Meet) and (Out, Take), for each value of p. If intentions matter, then players should become
more prosocial as the value of p increases; as a result, the Trust profile (In,Meet) should be more
likely to emerge at higher values of p. Statistical tests of the relationship between action choices (or
profiles) and the value of p are reported in Table A1 at the end of this paper.
Despite being embedded in a more complex setting, behavior at the extreme values of p is
very much in line with previous findings, with similar rates of prosociality for both A and B.15
14This includes p ∈ {0, 1} for B and p = 1 for A in McCabe et al. (2003); p = 1 for A and B in Charness and
Dufwenberg (2006); p ∈ {0, 0.75, 1} for B and p ∈ {0.75, 1} for A in Cox and Deck (2006). To facilitate comparisons,
a summary table of the relevant experimental features and findings of each study can be found in OA-A.4.
15The proportion of B players who share when p = 0 (dictator game) is almost identical across studies; for p = 1,
it is very close to CD1 06 (the game closest in terms of payoff structure) and somewhat smaller to the other two
papers (although not significantly so). Relative to the other studies, A’s level of prosociality when p = 1 is slightly
lower, but only significantly so relative to McCabe et al. (2003) (p-value = 0.065); unlike Cox and Deck (2006), the
In rate does not drop for p in the range 0.7-0.8.
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Importantly, B’s degree of prosociality rises with p, with an increase in the Meet rate from 34%
at p = 0 to 50% at p = 1 (p-value = 0.057, one-sided t-test). Although the positive linear trend
misses statistical significance (β = 0.177, p-value = 0.132 for the full sample), B’s prosociality is
somewhat sensitive to whether p takes a low, medium or high value, where pL ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3},
pM ∈ {0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7} and pH ∈ {0.8, 0.9, 1}.16 Given the observed Meet rate σB(p), the best
response of a risk neutral A player is almost perfectly monotone increasing in p.17 However, A’s
behavior appears to be insensitive to the amount of noise, with rates of prosociality around 50%
across all values of p. As will be shown in the next section, this flat pattern in the aggregate hides
substantial heterogeneity at the individual level. Putting together the behavior of A and B, the
frequency of (In,Meet) profiles more than doubles as p increases from 0 to 1 (10.5% vs 23.7%,
p-value = 0.066 on a one-sided t-test). The positive linear trend is significant (β = 0.184, p-value
= 0.057 for the full sample), although most of the increase seems to occur around p = 0.5. On
the other hand, the frequency of (Out, Take) is relatively stable across values of p at around 30%;
it is significantly higher than the proportion of (In,Meet) for p ≤ 0.3 (pL category) and almost
identical to it for p ≥ 0.8 (pH category).
4.1.2 Distribution of beliefs as a function of p
Another way to study the effect of p on individual decisions is to look at subjects’ belief patterns. If
intentions matter and players form consistent beliefs, then B’s first-order belief σ∗A and A’s second-
order belief σ∗∗A should be increasing in p. Figure 3(a) contrasts the mean beliefs of A and B with
the observed In rate σA at each value of p, while Figure 3(b) shows kernel density estimates of the
distribution of beliefs for low, medium and high values of p (see OA-A.1 for a complete breakdown
by value of p). Table A2 at the end of the paper presents statistical tests of the effect of p on mean
beliefs (Panel A) and median beliefs (Panel B).18
Mean beliefs exhibit a modest positive trend. On average, B players expect A to be 10 percentage
points more likely to choose In when p = 1 relative to when p = 0 (61.8% vs 51.8%, p-value =
0.113, one-sided t-test). In turn, the average guess of A players about B’s belief increases by
13 percentage points from p = 0 to p = 1 (44.4% vs 57.6%, p-value = 0.097, one-sided t-test.)
Although the positive linear trend is insignificant in most specifications, the average guess of A and
16A sensitivity analysis to different cutoff values of pL, pM and pH is presented in OA-A.3; results are qualitatively
similar, although somewhat weaker, with alternative breaks of the data.
17It is easy to verify that A’s optimal strategy under risk neutrality is to choose In provided that σB ≥ 0.375; given
the observed Meet rate σB(p), A’s best response is σA(p) = 0 for all p ≤ 0.5 except 0.4 and σA(p) = 1 otherwise.
Allowing for small levels of risk aversion (for instance, by assuming u(x) = x
1−α
1−α with α ≥ 0.2) guarantees that σA
is fully monotone increasing in p. See OA-A.5 for more details
18The findings discussed here are robust to alternative definitions of the cutoff values for pL, pM and pH ; see
sensitivity analysis in OA-A.3.
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Figure 3: Relationship between beliefs and value of p
(a) Mean belief of A and B by value of p
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(b) Distribution of beliefs for A and B for pL, pM and pH
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B is somewhat sensitive to whether p takes a low or a medium value. While the mean beliefs of A
and B present a common trend, they differ in levels. The B players on average overestimate the
In rate (significantly so for all p ≥ 0.3), with a mean deviation of 10.7 percentage points across all
values of p. The average guess of the A players closely follows the observed In rate, with a mean
absolute deviation of 4.5 percentage points across all values of p. As a result, A underestimates B’s
guess (but only significantly so for p ∈ {0.3, 0.4}), with a mean deviation of 8.8 percentage points.
While the effect of p on mean beliefs is relatively modest, it is more apparent for other measures
of central tendency; in particular, the modal and median beliefs increase in an almost perfectly
monotone fashion for A and B. Figure 3(b) shows a progressive shift of the mode from about 0.4
for B (0.2 for A) when p is low, to about 0.9 (for both A and B) when p is high. Similarly, quantile
regressions show a strong positive effect of p on the median belief of A and B, which increases from
0.4 for A (0.5 for B) at low values of p to 0.8 (for both A and B) at high values of p.
Conclusion 1 : At the aggregate level, a weakening of A’s level of agency as measured by a lower
value of p has a negative effect on prosocial behavior and beliefs. The introduction of noise leads
to fewer realizations of the Trust profile and more pessimistic beliefs. However, behavior appears
somewhat less responsive to p than beliefs; in particular, A’s behavioral response is essentially flat.
4.2 Individual heterogeneity
The study of aggregate behavior only gives a partial view of players’ sensitivity to changes in the
amount of noise. For instance, if two groups of subjects of the same size respond to p in opposite
manner, their aggregate behavior will appear to be irresponsive to p. In this section, I take a closer
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look at individual strategies and beliefs in order to further investigate the extent to which perceived
intentions may affect prosociality.
4.2.1 A typology of behavioral types
Subjects can be broadly classified into 5 behavioral types depending on whether and how their chosen
action changes with p. The first two types correspond to subjects whose behavior is insensitive to
p, meaning that they either always play the selfish action Out/Take, or always play the prosocial
action In/Meet. The third and fourth types refer to subjects who switch their action exactly once
as p increases, either from the selfish to the prosocial action (monotone increasing type) or from the
prosocial to the selfish action (monotone decreasing type). The last type refers to the non monotone
subjects who switch action multiple times.19
While the first 3 types can be rationalized by the theory presented in Section 2.2.3 (selfish play,
pure altruism, case where intentions matter), the monotone decreasing and non monotone types
cannot. As discussed below, non monotone behavior can be largely explained by random play. For
the monotone decreasing types, an examination of subjects’ nswers to the exit questionnaire sheds
some light on their motivation (see OA-C4 & -E). The prosociality of these subjects appears to
be inversely related to B’s chances of determining the final outcome, which happens only if In is
realized. In other words, B is more likely to be prosocial when the cost of prosociality is low i.e.
when his decision is unlikely to be consequential. Anticipating this, A is then less likely to choose
In when p is high.
One way of capturing this idea is to assume that B’s utility of acting prosocially has a “warm
glow” component (Andreoni 1989, 1990): besides his material payoffs, B cares about appearing
altruistic, whether his decision matters ex post or not (impure altruism). Formally, assume that
B’s utility function is given by uB(σ) = EB[mB(σ)] + Φ(σB) where Φ(1) = φ > 0 and Φ(0) = 0,
meaning that B gets warm glow utility φ from choosing Meet and 0 otherwise. Under the strategy
method, B must select an action without knowing whether In was realized and form expectations
about his material payoffs. Letting q(p, σ∗A) := pσ
∗
A+
1
2(1−p) denote B’s belief that In was realized,
B will therefore choose Meet over Take provided that
5(1− q(p, σ∗A)) + 10q(p, σ∗A) + φ ≥ 5(1− q(p, σ∗A)) + 14q(p, σ∗A)
⇔ q(p, σ∗A) ≤
φ
4
19In order to classify subjects, I discard A’s choice for p = 0, as decisions were inconsequential in this case. For
instance, a subject who played In when p = 0 and Out afterwards is categorized as somebody who always played
Out. Accounting for decisions at p = 0 would only slightly change the classification of A players (+1 for monotone
increasing, +1 for monotone decreasing, -1 for always Out, -1 for always In).
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Under some restrictions on φ, it can be shown that σB(p) is decreasing in p and therefore A’s best
response σA(p) is also decreasing in p; see Appendix for more details.
4.2.2 Individual heterogeneity in behavior and beliefs
Table 1: Distribution of individual strategies
Behavioral pattern Parameter conditions % of A players % of B players Total %
for j ∈ {A,B} (model of Section 2.2) (freq) (freq) (freq)
σj = 0 for all p α+ θ < 12 26.3 39.5 32.9
(selfish case) (10/38) (15/38) (25/76)
σj = 1 for all p α ≥ 12 23.7 18.4 21.1
(pure altruism) (9/38) (7/38) (16/76)
∂σj
∂p
≥ 0 (> 0 for some p) α < 12 and α+ θ ≥ 12 21.1 23.7 22.4
(intentions matter) (8/38) (9/38) (17/76)
∂σj
∂p
≤ 0 (< 0 for some p) ∅ 21.1 10.5 15.8
[impure altruism] (8/38) (4/38) (12/76)
other (non monotone) ∅ 7.9 7.9 7.9
[random play] (3/38) (3/38) (6/76)
Table 1 presents the distribution of behavioral types described in the previous section. There are 4
main findings. First, over 75% of the observed behavioral patterns can be rationalized by the theory
discussed in Section 2.2.3; in particular, very few subjects switch their action more than once.20
Second, the behavior of a large fraction of subjects is irresponsive to changes in the environment.
As much as 50% of A players and 58% of B players select the same action for all values of p. While
an even fraction of A players s lect the prosocial and the selfish actions, the proportion of selfish B
players is twice as large as the proportion of pure altruists. Third, among subjects who react to the
environment, nearly half (17/35) behave in a way consistent with intention-based reciprocity. For
the B players, those subjects represent the second largest category after selfish types (23.7% of the
sample); their proportion is twice as large as the proportion of subjects who switch from the prosocial
to the selfish action at higher values of p. However, for the A players, the proportion of subjects
who play a monotone increasing strategy (consistent with intentions mattering) is counterbalanced
by an equal proportion of subjects who play a monotone decreasing strategy. Therefore, the flat
response observed at the aggregate level for the A players hides substantial heterogeneity at the
20Among the 6 subjects who do so, 5 exhibit a fairly erratic behavior, consistent with random play. The last subject
exhibits a behavior close to monotone increasing (case where intentions matter), which might have been what this
subject intended to play. See OA-A.2 for more details.
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individual level in the way subjects react to changes in the value of p.
A similar level of individual heterogeneity can be observed for belief patterns (see OA Table 1).
Relative to behavior, beliefs appear to be more responsive to changes in the value of p: while over
50% of subjects pick the same action irrespective of p, only 26% report the same beliefs regardless
of the amount of noise. The largest category corresponds to subjects whose beliefs (σ∗A for B and
σ∗∗A for A) are monotone increasing in p, consistent with the interpretation that trust in entions
matter. This is the modal category for both A and B (34% of the sample for both roles). As
previously observed for behavior, the fraction of B players with monotone increasing beliefs is about
twice as large as those with monotone decreasing beliefs (13/38 vs 7/38); on the other hand, there
is an almost equal proportion of A players in each category (13/38 vs 12/38). Subjects with non
monotone beliefs represent about 15% of the sample.
4.2.3 Relationship between individual behavior and beliefs
A final step to understand subjects’ response to the noise is to bring together behavior and be-
liefs. For each of the 5 behavioral types of Table 1, Figure 4 presents the mean belief and rate of
prosociality at each value of p (top panel for A and bottom panel for B). A full breakdown for each
subject can be found in OA-A.2.
Figure 4: Rates of prosociality and mean beliefs by behavioral type
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Beliefs vary greatly across behavioral types. For the A players, beliefs follow behavior fairly
closely. Among subjects whose propensity to choose In is monotone increasing in p (intentions
matter case), the mean belief increases sharply and is remarkably close to the actual In rate for
most values of p. For subjects whose propensity to be prosocial is decreasing in p (impure altruism
case), the mean belief also follows a monotone decreasing pattern, although beliefs decrease less
sharply than the In rate. Since the A players were asked for their second-order beliefs, the observed
similarity between behavior and beliefs could partly reflect subjects’ general tendency to believe
that others can predict their behavior well (Vanberg 2008, Ellingsen et al. 2010, Butler et al. 2015).
The beliefs of the B players convey additional information about the nature of their preferences.
First, among those whose behavior is insensitive to p, beliefs appear to be orthogonal to behavior;
in particular, both groups have very similar beliefs on average and those beliefs are far away from
their respective rates of prosociality. This finding is consistent with the interpretation of observed
behavior as reflecting selfish play and pure altruism, since beliefs about A’s prosociality should
not influence the propensity to be prosocial of those two types. Consistent with a warm glow
interpretation, subjects with a monotone decreasing behavior are less likely to choose Meet as their
confidence that A chose In increases, that is, as their decision becomes more likely to count. Finally,
the mean belief of subjects whose behavior is consistent with intention-based reciprocity is above
0.5 for all values of p but follows only a modest increase (from 0.66 at p = 0 to 0.76 at p = 1).
Beliefs are ascending for only about half of these subjects (4/9), and constant or descending for the
other half (see OA for the breakdown). Coming back to Assumptions A1-A3 in Subsection 2.2.2,
these findings suggest that the effect of p on B’s reciprocity cannot be solely explained by more
optimistic beliefs about A’s propensity to go In (indirect channel), but also by the amount of risk
contained in the decision to go In (direct channel).
Looking more closely at subjects with monotone increasing strategies (intentions matter case),
one can ask how much noise is perceived as too much noise for prosocial behavior to occur. First,
both A and B stop acting prosocially (σA(p) = σB(p) = 0) once p < 0.3; on the other hand, the
rate of prosociality reaches 1 once p ≥ 0.7 for A and once p ≥ 0.8 for B. In between, most of the
decline in prosocial behavior occurs over the interval [0.2,0.5], where a decrease in p by 0.1 leads
to a drop in the In (resp. Meet) rate by an average of 29.1 (22.2) percentage points. A similar
decrease in p by 0.1 over (0.5,0.7] (resp. (0.5, 0.8]) has a more modest effect on rates of prosociality,
with a decrease by an average of 6.25 percentage points for A (resp. 11.1 percentage points for B).
In other words, prosociality tends to prevail as long as A’s action is most likely to be implemented
(p > 0.5), but becomes seriously threatened when A stops to be the main first-stage actor.
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Conclusion 2: At the individual level, there is substantial heterogeneity in how subjects respond to
noisy environments. While intentions seem to matter for 20-25% of subjects, behavior is irresponsive
to p for about half of the sample. In addition, social image concerns appear almost as equally
important as trust intentions to explain aggregate behavior. Among those for whom intentions seem
to matter, prosociality falls sharply once A’s decision is implemented with a 50% chance or less.
6. Conclusion
Many experimental studies of social dilemma games find that perceived intentions affect one’s
propensity to be prosocial, in particular when it comes to trust relationships. If intentions matter,
then the ability to convey trust intentions in a credible manner should influence the onset of trust
relationships. The present paper tests this conjecture in a noisy binary trust game where actions may
only imperfectly reflect trust intentions. I manipulate the strength of the trust signal by varying the
probability with which the Sender’s action is implemented. Unlike most of the previous literature,
the experimental design exploits within-subject variation to identify the effect of intentions on
individual behavior and classify subjects into types depending on how they respond to the noise.
When actions are noisy signals of trust intentions, how much noise becomes too much noise for the
trust-reciprocity outcome to emerge?
I find that prosocial behavior and beliefs are affected by the credibility with which Senders can
signal their intentions to trust. The trust-reciprocity outcome is less likely to emerge as the value
of p decreases i.e. when the Sender has less control over the outcome; furthermore, beliefs become
increasingly more pessimistic. This paper therefore provides evidence that prosociality is sensitive to
the credibility with which Senders can convey trust intentions through their actions. One implication
of this finding is that trust relationships could be efficiently promoted by policies designed to increase
transparency of the decision-making environment. For instance, in collaborations involving multiple
actors and decision-making stages, procedures that make explicit the actual contribution of each
actor could foster trust by boosting one’s confidence that individual efforts will be acknowledged
and reciprocated.
Although intentions matter, they do not matter for everyone. The within-subject analysis of
this paper reveals that the effect of intentions on individual strategies is highly heterogeneous.
The behavior of half of the Senders and more than half of the Receivers is insensitive to whether
Senders have control over the final outcome. Furthermore, if perceived intentions seem to be a
key determinant of prosociality, the individual analysis suggests that social image concerns might
be almost as equally important to explain the behavioral patterns observed in the aggregate data.
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Because a large heterogeneity in individual responses can limit the efficacy of a given policy, more
research is needed to understand the distribution of social preferences in the population.
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Appendix
Comparative statics for the impure altruism case
Following the discussion of Section 4.2.1, assume that B maximizes uB(σ) = EB[mB(σ)] + Φ(σB)
where Φ(1) = φ > 0 and Φ(0) = 0. Letting q(p, σ∗A) := pσ
∗
A +
1
2(1− p) denote B’s belief that In is
realized, B chooses Meet over Take provided that
5(1− q(p, σ∗A)) + 10q(p, σ∗A) + φ ≥ 5(1− q(p, σ∗A)) + 14q(p, σ∗A)
⇔ q(p, σ∗A) ≤
φ
4
(∗∗)
There are 3 cases to consider, depending on the value of φ:
Case 1: φ ≥ 4. In this case, (∗∗) is always satisfied, regardless of the value of p and σ∗A. Thus
σB(p) = 1 for all p, that is, B chooses Meet irrespective of the amount of noise. As a response, A
always chooses In, i.e. σA(p) = 1 for all p.
Case 2: φ ∈ (2,4). Here, B chooses Meet if and only if
q(p, σ∗A) ≤
φ
4
⇔ σ∗A ≤ σ¯(p, φ) :=
1
2
+
φ− 2
4p
In this case, σ¯(p, φ) ≥ 0 and ∂σ¯∂p ≤ 0; furthermore, σ¯(p, φ) > 1 ⇔ p < φ2 − 1. Thus, for:
(i) p ∈ [0, φ2 − 1], B chooses Meet for all σ∗A. In turn, A chooses In regardless of σ∗∗A .
(ii) p ∈ (φ2 − 1, 1], B chooses Meet iff σ∗A ≤ σ¯(p, φ) and thus A chooses In iff σ∗∗A ≤ σ¯(p, φ).
In other words, when φ ∈ (2, 4), both σA(p) and σB(p) are (weakly) decreasing in p.
Case 3: φ ∈ [0,2]. In this case, it is easily verified that for:
(i) p ∈ [0, 1− φ2 ), B chooses Take for all σ∗A. In turn, A chooses Out regardless of σ∗∗A .
(ii) p ∈ [1− φ2 , 1], B chooses Meet iff σ∗A ≤ σ¯(p, φ) and thus A chooses In iff σ∗∗A ≤ σ¯(p, φ).
Since σ¯(p, φ) is now (weakly) increasing in p, both σA(p) and σB(p) are weakly increasing in p.
However, since σ¯(p, φ) is bounded above by 12 when φ ≤ 2, B will never chooseMeet for any σ∗A > 12 .
This prediction is largely inconsistent with the data presented in Section 4.2. In particular, 7 of
the 9 subjects in role B whose behavior is consistent with intention-based reciprocity chose Meet
at values of p for which σ∗A > 0.5, suggesting that the warm glow case φ ≤ 2 cannot explain their
behavior.
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Table A1: Effect of p on prosocial behavior
Panel A: Individual behavior Panel B: Action profiles
A’s In Rate B’s Meet Rate (In, Meet) (Out, Take)
Sample Full p 6= 0 Full p 6= 0 Full p 6= 0 Full p 6= 0
(I) Test of linear trend
Estimated effect of p 0.012 0.003 0.177 0.203 0.184* 0.187* -0.005 -0.019
[0.138] [0.142] [0.115] [0.121] [0.094] [0.095] [0.120] [0.128]
Predicted effect of p + + + −
(II) Rates of prosociality
by noise category
pL ≤ 0.3 0.493 0.5 0.329 0.325 0.118 0.123 0.296 0.298
pM ∈ [0.4, 0.7] 0.487 0.487 0.395 0.395 0.224 0.224 0.342 0.342
pH ≥ 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.474 0.474 0.254 0.254 0.281 0.281
Predictions∗ t-Stat values
σi,pL ≤ σi,pM 0.10 0.17 1.04 1.13 1.82** 1.80** 0.70 0.67
σi,pL ≤ σi,pH 0.00 0.00 1.64* 1.71** 1.99** 1.99** 0.17 0.2
σi,pM ≤ σi,pH 0.32 0.3 1.76** 1.76** 0.91 0.91 1.23 1.23
∗σi ∈ {σA, σB}
Observations 418 380 418 380 418 380 418 380
Notes: Linear probability models with the dependent variable equal to 1 if A (B) chose In (Meet) for Panel A, and
if the profile (In,Meet) (resp. (Out, Take)) was realized for Panel B, regressed on p treated as a continuous variable
in (I) and as a categorical variable in (II). Full (p 6= 0) sample includes (excludes) observations for p = 0. Standard
errors in square brackets clustered at the subject level for Panel A and at the level of a match for Panel B. Significance
in (II) assessed with one-sided t-tests; * and ** indicate p-value < 0.1 and < 0.05.
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HIGHLIGHTS 
 
• Prosociality in trust relations decreases when intentions are harder to read. 
• However the effect of noise on individual behavior is highly heterogeneous. 
• Understanding this underlying heterogeneity is essential for policy design.  
